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Abstract 
International donors have strongly encouraged the creation of spe-
cialized credit institutions in the last decade to service the needs of 
agricultural development. These institutions have a portfolio highly 
concentrated in agriculture and further in medium to long-term loans, 
little if any deposit or savings services and an expensive infrastructure 
to service loan targeting requirements of donors. Analysis of the data 
from the National Agricultural Development Bank in Honduras show that, 
contrary to donor expectations, an increasing share of donor targeted 
funds for agriculture in the bank's liabilities has not led to an in-
creased participation of agricultural loans in the total portfolio of the 
bank nor to an increase in the share of small sized loans in the agri-
cultural portfolio. This must reflect the fungibility of finance. 
At the same time, regression analysis performed on the development 
bank's cost function indicates that there is a significant lagged ratchet 
type effect of donor and central bank targeted funds on the intermedia-
tion costs of the bank. These derive from increased resources devoted to 
accounting, monitoring, record-keeping and reporting requirements of 
targeted credit programs. International donors and local governments 
should seriously consider reducing their loan targeting policies in light 
of the limited portfolio impact and the significant cost increasing 
effects these policies have on financial intermediaries. 
, 
Credit-Allocation Programs and Intermediation Costs 
in an Agricultural Development Bank 
1. Introduction 
Specialized credit institutions have received partic~lar attention 
from governments and international funding agencies in the last decade. 
Donors see these institutions as a financial innovation capable of in-
creasing the flow of internal and external finance to selected sectors 
arid client groups within the economy. These specialized institutions are 
characterized by a loan portfolio highly concentrated in agriculture and 
a limited scope for the provision of other banking services. 
Large amounts of targeted funds have been channelled through these 
agricultural development banks from governments and donor agencies. These 
funds are invariably lent out at concessionary interest rates, a practice 
that contributes to the fragmentation of credit markets in low income 
countries. Until recently, little attention had been given to the costs 
of financial intermediation associated with these special credit projects 
or lines of credit. It has been. assumed that these costs are negligible, 
with little effect on the behavior of the intermediaries or their cli-
ents. Recent research, however, has highlighted the importance of trans-
action costs associated with different stages of the intermediation pro-
cess in many low income countries.!/ 
Financial intermediation costs can be identified at three levels: 
(1) expenses incurred by depositors in searching for a depository insti-
tution and making deposits; (2) resources drawn upon by the intermediary 
in servicing deposits ~nd other funds, and in handling loan transactions; 
and (3) costs incurred by borrowers in negotiating, obtaining and re-
paying loans. In this study we concentrate on the costs borne by the 
intermediary and the relationship between these operational costs and 
loan targeting or end-use requirements. In particular we will document 
and analyze the effects of targeted funds on the intermediation costs of 
the National Agricultural Development Bank of Honduras (BANADESA). We 
will show that loan targeting requirements imposed on the bank have sig-
nificant cost-increasing effects on its operations. 
It is useful to distinguish between two effects of loan targeting on 
a lender's costs. The first effect is comprised of the direct costs of 
additional accounting and record-keeping personnel and materials neces-
sary to comply with the reporting requirements of speciil credit pro-
grams. These direct costs would also include all additional personnel 
(agronomists, livestock specialists, etc.) specifically hired and trained 
to service the project's clientele or target-groups. Increased costs due 
to loan monitoring and supervision are also classified under this first 
category. Second, there is an indirect (or less visible) effect derived 
from the impact of interest-rate ceilings and special loan rates that 
accompany targeted funds. These constraints on the usual practice of 
loan-rate differentiation force lenders to establish complicated loan 
procedures in order to discriminate between potential borrowers with 
different degrees of risk. These reg11latory-induced loan procedures 
generate further costs for both lenders and borrowers, in addition to the 
direct costs of loan targeting.~/ In what follows, however, we shall 
focus on the direct or visihle effects of targeted funds on the inter-
mediation costs (1f the bank in question. 
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We first present a brief background and a methodological discussion 
of the procedures used in the study. The next section documents the 
performance of targeted funds over time in the agricultural development 
bank and analyzes their effects on portfolio composition and costs. In 
the final section we draw out the major conclusions of our analysis. 
2. Background and Methodology 
The Honduran financial system has been working under different regu-
latory schemes during the last decade. These have included interest-
rate ceilings, manipulation of reserve requirements, and loan targeting, 
among other forms of intervention. There are 16 commercial banks, two 
government-owned development banks and several savings and loan institu-
tions in Honduras. The Agricultural Development Bank accounts for about 
one-tenth of the value of all new loans made by Honduran banks, and near-
ly 30 percent of the value of new formal loans made for agricultural 
purposes. Agricultural loans account for about three-quarters of the 
value of the bank's loan portfolio. 
The bank's cost function is used to assess the effects of targeted 
funds on the bank's intermediation costs. This cost function is derived 
assuming the financial intermediary minimizes costs subject to a pro-
duction constraint that relates the provision of banking services to the 
use of productive factors and inputs. Thus the cost function depends on 
output levels and factor prices. In the two-output, two-input case, this 
implicit function can be written as: 
(1) 
q 1 loans, q 2 : deposits, 
p 1 salaries and wage~, Pz : price of capital services. 
The cost function (1) is specified here in translogarithmic form, an 
approach used in a number of recent studies on banking costs.11 The 
rnain advantage of this functional form is its flexibility with respect to 
the characteristics of the underlying technology. The use of this func-
tional form is specially pertinent in multi-output production, as is the 
case of financial institutions producing at least two different outputs, 
loans and deposit services, in varying proportions.~/ 
Regulation-related variables are introduced in the cost function by 
assuming that the total demand for every factor of production Xi, can be 
decomposed into two parts: (a) Xil• which corresponds to the level of Xi 
consistent with an unregulated environment; and (b), Xi2• an additional 
quantity or a differential skill that is required by existing regula-
tions. Examples of these are additional personnel or special mechanisms 
devised to provide new customer services that compensate for deposit-rate 
ceilings, and teams hired and trained to deal with specific project funds 
and clientele. Also, additional accounting and record-keeping personnel 
become necessary to comply with the reporting requirements of special 
credit programs using targeted funds. 
Typical sources of targeted funds in Honduras are the central. bank, 
and donor agencies. Central-bank funds correspond mainly to crop-spe-
cific lines of credit designed to provid& short-term financing to small 
and medium-size farms. Foreign funds usually come in the form of spe-
cial projects targeted to specific activiLies and clientele, and tend to 
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include a larger proportion of long-term loans. In what follows, the 
term "external funds" will be used to refer to both central-bank and 
foreign funds. The other, non-targeted, source of funds for BANADESA are 
demand, savings and time deposits from public-sector institutions, and 
from the public at large. 
It is hypothesized that the effect of targeted funds on costs in the 
development bank includes a "ratchet" effect. That is, the increased 
level of costs growing out of a new credit project contracted by the bank 
does not decline to the previously existing cost level once the loan 
funds have been disbursed to the ultimate borrowers. Additional resour-
ces are employed or purchased at the beginning of the project in order to 
comply with the project's targeting requirements, but these resources are 
not laid-off or sold once the funds are disbursed. In short, they become 
fixed rather than variable costs. The cost function will thus incorpor-
ate a set of variables that capture the effect of targeted funds under 
this "ratchet" effect hypothesis. Three indicator variables (Sk,k • 
1,2,3) are defined to account for the effect of the three different sour-
ces of funds: deposits, central bank, and foreign funds. In order to 
capture the influence of targeted funds under the "ratchet" effect hypo-
thesis, Sks are defined so that Sk > 0 if the value of funds coming from 
source k has increased over the level observed in the previous year, 
otherwise Sk 8 O. Specifically, the value of Sk in year t (Skt) will 
follow a three-point distribution, such that: 
Skt • 0, if dkt ~ 0 
Skt = 1, if 0 < Akt ~ (1/2) dktm 
Skt • 2, if (1/2) dktm < dkt ~ dktm• 
where, dkt stands for the difference between the amount of funds coming 
from source k in year t, and the amount of these funds in year t-1. 
Aktm is the maximum value of this difference observed over the 
period covered by the data (1971-1982). 
A combined variable, S23 is similarly defined to account for the 
effect of all external funds combined (central bank and foreign funds 
together). The "ratchet effec.t" hypothesis implies that a positive sign 
is expected in the coefficients of the Sk variables that capture the 
effects of targeted funds, i.e., central-bank and foreign funds. The 
estimation considers the possibility that these effects may be lagged, 
particularly for foreign-donor funds, since this source of funding is 
often in the form of special projects with a delayed period of disburse-
ment and expenditures. Consequently, external funds combined, and for-
eign funds alone are also specified with a one-year lag; to capture the 
lagged effect increases in these sources of funds are likely to have on 
costs. 
Estimation of the translog cost function drew upon data for 28 bran-
ches of the National Agricultural Development Bank over the 12-year per-
iod 1971 through 1982. This estimation was undertaken both as a 
single equation (by OLS), and as a cost system with the cost-share equa-
tions (by GLS). Joint estimation of the cost system considerably im-
proved the efficiency of the parameter estimates, therefore, the results 
presented and discussed in the next section are based on this estimation 
technique. 
3. Loan-Targeting and Inte1~mediation Costs in the Development Bank 
As indicated above, targ~ted funds are identified as funds obtained 
from central-bank rediscount linHs, or from foreign donors. The term 
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"external funds'' is utilized here to refer to both central-bank and for-
eign funds combined. Non-targeted funds are demand, savings, and time 
deposits captured from public institutions and from the general public. 
An analysis of the relationships between the sources of funds and 
portfolio composition in this bank may be summarized as follows: (a) the 
growing share of external sources of funds (largely directed towards 
agriculture) throughout the period 1971-82 has not been _reflected in a 
significant change in the relative role of agricultural.loans in the 
portfolio. The fungibility of finance is at work here, with external 
funds substituting for own-deposit funds that have been transferred from 
agricultural to non-agricultural loans. (b) The increased share of ex- . 
ternal funds may have induced the re-allocation of non-targeted funds to 
increasingly larger-sized loans in the non-agricultural sector. This 
cost-saving adjustment compensates for the increasing costs of handling a 
growing proportion of external funds in the "targeted" portion of the 
loan portfolio. 
The cost-function estimates for the variables that capture effects 
of different sources of funds on intermediation costs are presented in 
table 1. Model 1 in this table includes the indicator variable for non-
targeted funds (own-deposits, $1), and the lagged combined effect of 
external funds (central bank and foreign funds). Model 2 also includes 
the non-targeted funds variable, but separates the effect of (current-
year) central bank funds from those of foreign funds with a one-year lag. 
The estimated coefficients for the variable that captures the ef-
fects of increases in the amount of non-targeted funds (S1, deposits) are 
not statistically different from zero, with very low asymptotic t-ratios 
in both models. Targeted funds show significant cost-increasing effects, 
whether they are included as a combined variable (column 1), or as sep-
arate effects (column 2). Given the typical features of central-bank and 
foreign-funded projects, model 2 is a more appropriate representation of 
these targeting schemes than model 1. The results of model 2 indicate 
that increases in central-bank funds will have a contemporaneous 
cost-increasing effect on the development bank <~2 > 0), given the short-
term nature of the targeted programs funded through rediscount lines of 
the central bank. On the other hand, additional funds originated in 
foreign sources, usually targeted to medium-to-long-term activities with 
extended periods of disbursement, will exercise a cost-increasing effect 
with a one-year lag (~3 > 0 for S3(t-1)). 
In summary, these results support the hypothesis that there is a 
lagged, "ratchet"-type effect of targeted funds on the' intermediation 
costs of the development bank. Overall intermediation costs are in-
creased as a result of additional funding received from external sources. 
This effect is more significant in the case of rediscount lines of credit 
coming from the central bank than in the case of foreign-funded projects. 
On the other hand, greater reliance on deposits as a source of loan-funds 
will not affect overall intermediation costs of the development bank. 
4. Summary and Conclusions 
In this study we have documented and analyzed the effects of tar-
geted funds on the intermediation costs of the National Agricultural 
Development Bank of Honduras. Our results show that loan targeting re-
quirements imposed on this lender have significant cost-increasing ef-
fects on its operations. 
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WP- found that the increasing share of targeted funds for agriculture 
in the liability portfolio of the development bank has not resulted in an 
ihcreased participation of agricultural loans in the portfolio. Our 
analysis also indicates that this increased reliance on targeted funds 
has not had a significant effect on the average loan size of the bank's 
portfolio of new loans. These findings suggest that loan targeting has 
failed to meet the goals of an increased share for agricultural credit 
and an increased share of small-sized loans in the loan-portfolio. 
Table 1. Effects of Loan-Targeting on the Intermediation Costs 
of the Development Bank: Estimated Coefficients for 
Different Sources of Funds.a 
Source of Funds, Parameter 
Non-targeted funds 
Targeted funds 
w23, lagged central bank 
and foreign (S23(t-1)) 
w3, lagged foreign funds (S3(t-1)) 
Weighted R-square of the cost system 
F-test of Joint Null Hypothesis: 
Wk "' 0, all k 
Estimated Coefficients 
in Different Modelsb 
(1) (2) 
0.0056 
( 0. 31) 
0.0756 
(2.81)* 
0.73 
3.13** ' 
0.0145 
(0.76) 
0.1129 
(4.20)* 
0.0525 
(1.94)** 
0.74 
5.30* 
a Cost-system estimation, other parameters of the cost function not 
reported. Complete results are reported in Cuevas, and may be 
requested from the authors. 
b Asymptotic t-ratios in parenthesis. 
* : significant at 0.01 level; ** : significant at 0.05 level 
• 
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Regression analysis pertormed on the development-bank's cost ±unc-
tion indicates that there is a lagged, "ratchet"-type eftect of targeted 
funds on the intermediation costs of this bank. Both foreign-funded 
projects and central-bank rediscount lines created additional intermedi-
ation costs, due to the increased resources that the bank devoted to 
accounting, monitoring, record-keeping and reporting, in order to comply 
with the requirements of targeted programs. The main pol_icy implication -
ot these results is that international donors and local governments 
should seriously consider reducing their loan-targeting policies in light 
of the limited portfolio impact and the significant cost-increasing 
ettects these policies have on financial intermediaries. 
Notes 
1/ Several essays on these subjects appear in Adams, Graham and Von 
Pischke. See also Cuevas. 
21 An extensive treatment of regulation-induced costs of financial inter-
mediation is found in Cuevas. 
3/ Benston, Hanweck and Humphrey; Cuevas. 
4/ For a detailed characterization of the translog function, see 
Binswanger; Christensen, Jorgenson and Lau. 
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